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Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil
Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil

Procedure and in the Federal Rules
Arthur Taylor von Mehren*
I.

Introduction

Whether of civil or common law persuasion, Western jurists agree
that first instance procedural systems must be reasonably efficient and
expeditious as well as ensure that decisions are made in the light of the
relevant facts and law. In addition, the process should be -procedurally
fair. For example, each party should be afforded the opportunity to be
heard.
These comparable goals and values have traditionally been pursued
through strikingly different institutional arrangements. The American
system concentrates the trial in a single episode. Before trial, the lawyer
for each party carefully prepares the legal and factual issues that may
arise; discovery is had of the cause materials available to the other side,
and prospective witnesses are insistently questioned. At the trial itself,
the examination of witnesses is, subject to minor qualifications, conducted by the lawyers; the judge presides but does not bear primary responsibility for the development of the case nor for the questioning of
witnesses.
European systems such as that of the German Federal Republic present a very different picture. Trials are discontinuous. Typically, the
lawyers are not fully prepared oh the legal and factual issues that may
arise when the trial begins. Pretrial discovery is not available; indeed,
witnesses that have been identified before trial are usually not questioned by lawyers in the course of their preparation for trial. At the trial
itself, the judge's role is central; the court has a large responsibility for
the questioning of witnesses as well as for moving the case rapidly to the
point when it can be taken for decision.'
At first blush, one might think that these different procedural styles
result from American acceptance of the adversarial principle and European acceptance of the inquisitorial principle. The premise, however,
would be faulty. Both sides of the Atlantic accept the adversarial princi* Story Professor of Law, Harvard University. I have benefited greatly from my colleague Assistant Professor David B. Wilkins's comments on drafts of this article. I thank him for his help and Ms.
Claudia Koss for her research assistance.
1 For a general discussion of civil procedure in Germany, see Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer,
Phases of German Civil Procedure(pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958). The portion of this
article that discusses procedure in first instance, id. at 1199-268, is published with revisions in A. VON
MEHREN &J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAw SYsaM 151-203 (2d ed. 1977). The revisions take into account relevant amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), including those effective onJanuary 1, 1975, but not those that came into force onJuly 1, 1977. A stimulating comparative discussion
which may be too sanguine with respect to some aspects of the German system - is Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985).
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Each party prepares and controls the dimensions of his cause; the
enforcement of legal rights is left to the self-interest of those concerned.
Of course, no contemporary procedural system carries the adversarial principle to its logical extreme; too often an assumption on which it
rests-that parties, though not themselves equal in litigational ability,
will be represented by counsel of relatively equal effectiveness-does not
hold in practice. However, differences in American and continental European views respecting the adversarial principle are far too small to explain the differences in first instance procedural style remarked above.
A recent discussion by Professor Damaska sees the continental style
as a consequence of an hierarchical ideal of officialdom while the American style rests on a coordinate ideal. In the hierarchical model, adjudicators are professional officials, organized in a strict hierarchy, who render
decisions according to technical standards. In coordinate systems, adjudicators are lay officials (e.g., the jury), authority is distributed horizontally, and in deciding controversies recourse to substantive standards of
3
justice is encouraged.
Damaska goes on to argue that the hierarchical model implies procedural arrangements found in contemporary continental European civil
procedure: regular and comprehensive hierarchical review, the primordial importance of the case file which condenses and abstracts the cause
materials, piecemeal trial, and a desire to regulate the proceedings to the
extent feasible by "an internally consistent network of unbending
rules."'4 Contemporary American civil procedure exhibits in considerable measure the contrasting implications of the coordinate model: concentrated trial, relatively little emphasis on regular appellate review, use
of live testimony (rather than testimony recorded in written form), reliance on private action, especially in preparing material for consideration
at trial, and, finally, trials subject to extensive technical regulation but
with the adjudicator retaining considerable discretion. 5
This approach is interesting and suggestive. 6 It may, however, give
too little attention to discrete institutional characteristics that profoundly
2 "When writers take the shortcut and speak of German or other Continental civil
procedure as
nonadversarial' (a usage that I think should be avoided although I confess to having been guilty of it
in the past), the description is correct only insofar as it refers to that distinctive trait of Continental
civil procedure, judicial conduct of fact-gathering." Langbein, supra note 1, at 824 n.4. It should be
noted that the "judicial conduct of fact-gathering" to which Langbein refers does not involve the
court in independent investigatory activities; what is meant are judicial conduct of the examination
of witnesses, naming of expert witnesses by the court, judicial control of the sequence in which
evidence is presented, and so forth.
The courts could probably do a good deal more than they typically do presently in instigating the
presentation of evidence; as a practical matter the taking of only one form of evidence, the hearing of
witnesses, requires a party request. See Schneider, Die Ablehnung von Beweisantragen im Zivilprozess, 75
ZErrsCHRIFT FOR ZsvLPROZESS 173, 177 (1962); D. COESTER-WALTJEN, INTERNATIONALEs BEwEIs-

REcrr 22-23 (1983). The extent to which the contemporary American and German systems are
appropriately characterized as "adversarial" is discussed in A. JUNKER, DISCOVERY IN DEUTSCHENAMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSVERKEHR 78-84 (1987).
3 See generally M. DAMASKA,THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTnORITY (1986).
4 Id. at 54-55.
5 See id. at 57-66.
6 For a general discussion of Professor Damaska's views, see von Mehren, Book Review, 97 YALE
LJ. 341 (1987).
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shape dvil procedure in first instance but whose presence cannot be explained in terms of preferences for a coordinate or an hierarchical officialdom. This essay explores the importance for procedural
arrangements generally of whether the system's trial stage is concentrated or discontinuous. Its thesis is that, although historical considerations, social and political values, and sociological and psychological
assumptions are important in assessing comparatively contemporary
American and continental European civil procedure in first instance, an
institutional feature has great explanatory power. The entailments of a
truly concentrated trial system are very different from those of a truly
discontinuous trial system. 7
As has already been noted, both the American and continental European systems accept the need for a reasonably complete development of
the factual side of the controversy before decisions are taken. At the
same time, both recognize the importance of accomplishing the task of
preparation in a relatively efficient and expeditious manner. Systems
that insist on a concentrated trial and reject the inquisitorial principle
can pursue the complementary, but not entirely compatible, goals of
comprehensiveness and expedition in basically two ways: reliance can be
placed upon the parties' pleadings or, alternatively, upon pretrial exchanges and investigations that permit each side to probe the other's
case. Systems that combine the adversarial principle with a discontinuous trial could also use these techniques. However, they have another
choice: continuances at trial can be permitted where needed to allow the
development and presentation of new cause material required to meet
the opponent's presentation.
Theoretically, a system's decision concerning whether to provide for
concentrated trials or for discontinuous ones could flow from judgments
respecting how the most acceptable balance can be struck between the
goals of adequate preparation, on the one hand, and reasonably expeditious and not excessively costly preparation, on the other. In reality,
however, historically given institutional considerations may make it impossible for some systems to utilize the discontinuous trial. For example,
the American system is institutionally required to concentrate trials because of the jury. (Courts of Equity, which did not have juries, used discontinuous trials.) The presence of a jury makes a discontinuous trial
impractical. Great administrative difficulty and personal inconvenience
would be involved in reconvening the jury from time to time over an
extended period. Moreover, at least until relatively recently, material
presented at widely separated points in time could not be preserved in a
form that would have enabled the jury to refresh its recollection when it
8
ultimately came to deliberate and render the verdict.
7 For an earlier exploration by the author of these themes, see von Mehren, The Significancefor
Procedural Practice and Theoy of the Concentrated Triab Comparative Remarks, EUROPXiSCHES RECHTsDENKEN xN GEsCHIMCsT

UND GEGENWART 361 (N. Horn ed. 1982).

8 It has been suggested that modern technology in the form of videotaped evidence could make
the jury system compatible with the discontinuous trial. See M. FRANKEL, PARrsANJuSrIcE 109-14
(1980).
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Each of the three techniques described has advantages and disadvantages. The strengths and weaknesses of the first two can be suggested by brief glances at American civil procedure in first instance,
before as well as under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because
the third technique is unfamiliar to American jurists, its attractions and
difficulties deserve a somewhat fuller development. This is undertaken
in a discussion of recent reforms in first instance civil procedure in the
Federal Republic of Germany. Thereafter, comparative reflections are
ventured on recent developments under the German Code of Civil Procedure and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.

First Instance Procedure in Concentrated Trial Systems:
The American Experience

A concentrated trial requires that preparation for the presentation of
the matter to the adjudicator be essentially complete before the trial begins. With respect to cause materials available to a party, the obstacles to
full preparation of a case prior to trial are inadequate canvassing and
understanding of the factual and legal issues that can arise from these
materials. However, a further problem remains: how is a party to prepare for trial with respect to legal and factual issues arising from cause
material unavailable to him, in particular from cause material controlled
by the adversary? A party can hardly complain if he (or his counsel) fails
to prepare his case fully, especially so far as that case arises from cause
material under his control. Grounds for complaint exist, however, where
a party's preparation is inadequate because the relevance of a given legal
or factual issue emerges from cause material that the other party discloses only at trial. Accordingly, concentrated-trial systems seek to minimize the possibility that a party will be surprised in this fashion at the
trial stage where time constraints may well render effective response
impossible.
Concentrated-trial systems that accept the adversarial principle have
essentially two ways in which they can approach this problem. The first
relies on an extended pleading process and the second utilizes pretrial
exchanges and investigations to frame the issues and to give notice of the
legal and factual positions that each party intends to take.
During the 19th Century, American procedural systems relied on the
pleading process to avoid surprise. Each party's pleadings had to state
his position as well as respond to every position taken in the opposing
party's pleadings. Response could take the form of admission, denial, or
"confession and avoidance" by way of affirmative defense. This exchange was to continue until no further points of agreement or disagreement between the parties emerged. Only the issues thus defined were
considered at the trial stage.
Any approach to issue framing and notice giving that depends essentially on the pleading process is inherently complex and rigid. If the process is to be held within reasonable bounds, the pleadings must set out
legal propositions. The need to do so renders the cause, as presented in the pleadings, abstract and gives a considerable advantage to
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the more imaginative and technically skilled lawyer. In the United States
these difficulties were exacerbated because, for historical reasons, pleadings were framed in terms of the common-law forms of action even
though they were, in various respects, remote from contemporary reality.
The forms of action had originally developed in quite different economic
and social circumstances. Moreover, in time, fictitious allegations had
been introduced in order to modernize the substantive law that each
form secreted. However, even without the incubus of the forms of action, a pleading approach to the surprise problem-though potentially
relatively expeditious and reasonably inexpensive-is probably too technical and arbitrary to maintain itself except on afaute-de-mieux basis.
Accordingly, in a movement for procedural reform that began in the
mid-19th Century with the work of David Dudley Field and culminated in
the promulgation in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
pleading approach was supplanted by an approach that combines an abbreviated pleading process with arrangements designed to permit each
party to familiarize himself before trial with the details of the positions
and the evidence that the other party may advance when the controversy
is ultimately presented to the adjudicator. Although the original rationale for the introduction of such pretrial procedures was the avoidance of
surprise, they have come to serve another function as well: a party can be
required to disclose cause material under his control that he would, because it favors the other party, otherwise suppress. A much simpler and
less extended form of discovery-the full exchange by the parties before
trial of documents and witness statements-would suffice to deal with the
surprise problem and would produce fewer problems than expanded discovery entails. The latter approach to the surprise problem avoids the
difficulties associated with a full blown pleading approach but gives rise
to others. Particularly, as pretrial procedures come to serve purposes
other than the mere avoidance of surprise at the trial, use of the system
increasingly becomes extremely time-consuming and very costly.
Reliance on these techniques thus generates its own particular
problems. Above all, there is a strong tendency for discovery to be used
more extensively land aggressively with the consequence that proceedings become more and more expensive and lengthy. These developments in due course call forth reform efforts. One of the forms these
efforts are taking is perhaps a modest return to reliance on the pleadings.
As amended in 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules provides for the imposition of sanctions-in particular an order to pay the other party resulting expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee-where an attorney
signs a pleading unless "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry... [the pleading] is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law .... "
However, in view of the system's institutional setting, arrangements,
and values, solutions to perceived abuses or excesses in pretrial proceedings under the Federal Rules can today hardly be addressed in terms of a
return to a highly developed system of pleading. Inevitably, improve-
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ments must, for the most part, be sought by giving the judge a larger and
stronger role at the pretrial stage. The 1983 amendments to Rule 16 and
Rule 26 are recent and dramatic proof of this proposition. These developments are discussed in the last section of this essay.
III.

First Instance Procedure in Discontinuous Trial Systems:
The German Experience
The basic problem encountered by discontinuous trial systems is delay after the trial has begun and not the avoidance of surprise. Delay can
have one or both of two causes. First, the system may be stretched beyond its capacity so that the court is compelled to apportion small
amounts of time to each of the matters before it rather than allow as
much time as can be effectively used. The only solution for such delay is
to increase the capacity of the system. Second, delay occurs because one
or both parties are not ready to proceed promptly and in full measure to
each successive step in the discontinuous proceeding.
We do not consider the delay problem caused by the system's insufficient capacity but only delay for which the parties in some sense bear
responsibility. The problem that this form of delay raises has different
characteristics in concentrated and in discontinuous trial systems. In
concentrated systems, the problem centers upon the pretrial stage. Furthermore, concentration of the trial tends to limit somewhat the extent to
which a party will seek, or can obtain, repeated time extensions at the
pretrial stage. The deadlines set for various steps to be taken during this
stage will, by and large, involve substantial periods rather than driblets of
time. Also, in courts with crowded dockets, postponing the time set for
trial typically involves significant further delay in getting to trial. The
hand of the court and of any party interested in bringing the controversy
to the stage of decision is significantly strengthened by the serious delay
in beginning the trial stage that prolonging the pretrial stage entails.
In discontinuous systems, this delay problem centers upon the trial
stage. It is easy enough to bring the matter before the court. The difficulty is to ensure, once the proceedings have begun, that the cause is
prepared and fully presented with reasonable promptness. Each instance
of delay at the trial stage is, in itself, usually relatively unimportant. A
further hearing normally can be scheduled for the near future. Consequently, the other party (or his lawyer) finds persuasive opposition difficult and the court is psychologically inclined to grant requests for
postponement.
In modem times the problem of delay caused by one or both parties
has played a central role in various German movements for procedural
reform. In July 1977, there took effect the most important and extensive
reforms relating to procedure in first instance since the German Code of
Civil Procedure came into force in 1877. These reforms addressed the
problem of party-caused delay. 9 The Commission that proposed the
9 For recent evaluations of the 1977 reforms, see Greger, Rechtstatsdhliche Erkenntnisse zu den
Auswirkungen der Vereinfichungsnovelle in derPraxis, 100 ZErrSCHRIFr FOR ZMLPROZESS 377 (1987) (survey of Bavarian judicary); Pieper, Eiljustiz stalt materiellerRichtgkeit?, FESTSCHRIFr FOR RUDOLF WAS-
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1977 reforms remarked in its report that "[w]hen the work began, the
call for an expedited procedure was in the foreground. The increasing
delay in the procedure endangered the protective'function of the proceedings and threatened to undermine the administration of justice." 10
In reforming first instance procedure with a view to reducing partycaused delay, several courses of action were, in theory, open to the German legislature. However, radical solutions such as a dramatic shift from
the adversarial principle to the inquisitorial principle and the substitution of official prosecution for party prosecution were not advanced."1
Basically two approaches were considered: (1) maintain the discontinuous trial but give at the trial stage greater emphasis to the principle of
official prosecution; (2) move significantly in the direction of a concentrated trial, providing for development of the cause prior to the trial
stage either by (a) adopting a more developed pleading process or (b)
requiring full pretrial preparation and providing the lawyers with the
tools they would need to achieve this level of preparation.
The German reform did not take the step, which is essential if an
adversarial system is to have a truly concentrated trial, of placing on the
lawyers the burden of preparing fully before the trial. It was believed
that such an approach, overall, would not expedite the handling of litigation, often would not work, and would render the proceedings more
costly.'

2

The reformers moved on two interconnected fronts. First, machinery was put in place to make the trial significantly less discontinuous than
had been the case in the past. Second, a much higher degree of pretrial
preparation was required. These goals were pursued in two ways. The
court was given greater directive powers and responsibilities. Theoretically speaking, the system moved away from the principle of party prosecution toward the principle of official prosecution or, perhaps more
accurately, official management. In addition, more responsibility for pretrial preparation was placed on the parties and the pleading process took
on greater importance.
Article 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as revised in 1977, states
the reform's theme:
The legal controversy is in principle to be disposed of in a thoroughly
prepared session for oral argument (principal session) (in einem umfassend vorbereiteten Termin zur mzindlichen Verhandlung (Haupttermin)).
SERMANN 773, 787 (C. Broda et al. ed. 1985) (relatively ineffective and at the expense of substantive
justice).
10 BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER Jus-nz, BERICHT DER KOMMISSION FOR DAS ZIVLPROZESSRECHT 18
(1977). The criticism has been made that the reform proposals were not based on thorough empirical investigation. See Pieper, supra note 9, at 787.
11 Some writers argue that the reforms to date have been far too limited to achieve significant
results. See, e.g., Bender, Mehr Rechtsstaatdurch Verfahrensvereinfachung,FEsTscHmFr FUR RUDOLF WASSERMANN 629 (C. Broda et al. ed. 1985). Bender would gready simplify procedural requirements and
severely limit appellate review in matters that were considered relatively insignificant for the parties.
See id.
12 BUNDESMINISTERIUM DERJUSTIz, supra note 10, at 31-32. There may well have been deeper
reasons for the lack of interest in solutions that entailed pretrial interrogatory and discovery procedures. See p. 626 infra.
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The presiding judge orders either a prior first session for argument (einemfr7hen ersten Termin zur mtfndliwhen Verhandlung) or provides

for a written preliminary procedure (ein schriftliches Vorverfahren).
The oral argument is to take place as soon as possible.
The German system had long cherished the ideal of concentrating
preliminary argument, proof-taking, and final argument in a single session. In 1924, article 272b was added to the Code.' 3 This provision empowered the court to make various preparatory orders on its own motion
prior to sessions for oral argument. For example, the parties could be
required to complete or explain their preparatory writings and to produce certain documents; witnesses nominated by the parties in their writings could also be summoned to the oral argument. The ambition was,
as article 272b put it, to "dispose of the legal controversy as far as possible in one oral hearing." However, prior to 1977 the desired concentration had not been achieved.
Revised article 272, which came into force in 1977, envisages a thoroughly prepared principal session for oral argument at the end of which,
in the great majority of cases, the cause can be taken by the court for
decision. Revised article 273, which also dates from 1977, admonishes
the court to see to it that the parties state their positions in a timely and
comprehensive fashion at every stage of the proceedings. This article
also contains the preparatory powers that article 272b, now deleted, had
first given the courts in 1924.
Article 272, as revised in 1977, contemplates that the principal session will be prepared either by a prior first session or by a written procedure. The so-called prior first session is regulated in article 275. In
preparation for such a session, the court can require that the defendant
reply to the complaint in writing and within a time set by the court. Alternatively (andernfalls), the court can order the defendant to communicate to the court promptly and in writing the means of defense
(Verteidigungsmittel) on which he intends to rely. The plaintiff can also be
required to respond within a given time and in writing to the defendant's
14
reply.
The alternative to a prior first session is the written preparatory procedure regulated in article 276.15 If the court chooses to employ this
method of preparing for the principal session, the defendant will be required to indicate promptly whether he intends to defend; if so, he must
within a relatively short time (normally two weeks) reply in writing to the
complaint.
The principal session is regulated in article 278. At the session, parties who appear are heard with respect to the cause, proof is taken, and
issues of fact and law are argued. The contemplation is that normally the
matter will be ripe for decision at the session's close. However, the court
13 Ordinance of Dec. 22, 1923, art. I§ A(2), [1923] 1 RGB1 1240, which became art. 272b.
14 At least in Bavaria, this possibility is used relatively infrequently. See Greger, supra note 9, at
379.
15 In Bavaria, individual courts have a tendency to prefer one form of preparation over the
other, taking the system as a whole, however, no clear preference exists. See id at 378. The written
preparatory procedure has, however, become considerably more important than it was in 1978. Id
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is not permitted to rest its decision on a legal point that a party can be
said "to have overlooked or to have considered irrelevant.. ." unless the
point affects only an accessory claim (Nebenforderung) or the party had an
opportunity to take a position with respect to the issue. Therefore, if a
second principal session is to be avoided, the court must make certain
that, in preparing for the first principal session, the parties have not overlooked important legal issues. If for any reason a further session is required,1 6 it is to be held as promptly as possible.
The parties must cooperate in the effort to concentrate the first instance proceedings. Article 282 provides that each party is to produce
his means of attack and defense, legal and factual alike, in a timely and
careful manner, one that seeks to facilitate the proceedings. Specifically,'"means of attack and defense, on which the other party probably
could not take a position without undertaking inquiries, are to be communicated before the oral hearing by preparatory writings in sufficient
time so that the other party can make the necessary inquiries." In addition, article 385a, introduced by the 1977 reform, provides that a court
can have witnesses heard by a "requested" or a "delegated" judge' 7 in a
proof taking before any oral hearing has occurred. A witness can also be
requested, in the situations contemplated by article 377111 and IV, to
make written statements before the holding of an oral hearing.18 Prior to
the reform, article 272b had authorized the ordering of comparable
measures but certain of them-for example, the hearing of witnesseswere to be carried out only after the oral hearing had begun.
A party's failure to meet the standard set by article 282 can have
several consequences. Article 283 provides that when a party in an oral
hearing is unable to take a position with respect to a late submission of
his opponent, the court is to grant permission to file a written statement
of position after the session's close., In the interest of expedition, the
court sets down a date for announcing its decision at the same time; of
course, timely statements of position must be considered by the court in
reaching that decision.
The principal sanctions for a party's failure to discharge its general
article 282 duty to facilitate the proceeding are set out in article 296.
The second paragraph of that article provides as follows:
Means of attack and defense that are not produced in a timely
fashion pursuant to § 282 para. 1 or that are not communicated in a
timely manner pursuant to § 282 para. 2, can be refused admission
when their reception would, in the court's free assessment (nach der
freien Uberzeugung des Gerichts), delay the disposition of the controversy
and the delay in submission is due to gross negligence.
16 In Bavaria, in most Landgerichte a second principal session is required in fewer than half of
the cases. See id. at 381.
17 For a discussion of the role of these judges, see A. VON MEHREN &J. GoRDLEY, supra note 1, at
188-89.
18 Article 385a further authorizes the obtaining, prior to any oral hearing, of official information
and expert opinions. The court can also "take a view" before holding the hearing.
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A stricter exclusionary rule attaches under paragraph 1 of article 296
where the court has set deadlines 19 for the submission of the means of
attack or defense in question that are not met. In such cases, late submissions are accepted only if the court is convinced in its free assessment
that admission will not delay the disposition of the controversy or if the
responsible party can furnish a satisfactory excuse for the delay.
Because German civil procedure, like continental European civil
procedure generally, permits at the first level of appellate review a full
redoing of the case, including reconsideration of evidence submitted below and the taking of new evidence, article 296 would lose much of its
significance if means of attack or defense excluded in first instance on the
ground of untimeliness could be freely introduced at the appeal stage.
Accordingly, paragraph 3 of article 528 provides that "[mleans of attack
and defense that were properly rejected in first instance, continue to be
excluded." Prior to the 1977 reform, article 529, now repealed, provided for the rejection of means of attack and defense, "that could have
been presented" below and "whose consideration would delay the handling of the litigation," when the second instance court, in its judgment,
concluded that the failure to submit below was intended to delay the proceedings or was due to gross negligence. However, submissions that had
been tendered to, but refused by, the court of first instance had to be
received. New article 528 is thus far less permissive than former article
529.20
The 1977 reform addresses not only the duties ofjudges but of parties (and their lawyers) as well. Judges are to see to it that the case is fully
and promptly prepared; parties and lawyers are to facilitate the proceedings by producing means of attack and defense in a careful and comprehensive manner. As we have seen, the reform provides the judges with
various tools to facilitate their task; however, new tools were not given to
21
the parties and their lawyers.
Today, just as before 1977, the parties are hardly in a position to
ferret out and question witnesses. 22 "Nor can the lawyers help the parties much. The canons of professional ethics (Grundstze des anwaltlichen
19

Art. 273,
2, no. 1; art. 275,
1, sent. 1,
3 & 4; art. 276,
1, sent. 2,
3; art. 277.
For purposes of imposing procedural penalties, no distinction is drawn in German law in terms
of whether party or counsel is responsible for a submission being late. E.g., BGH, Third Civil Senate, Decision of 11 Mar. 1976, 66 EBGH 122. Of course, the post-1977 consequences of holding a
party responsible for his lawyer's delay are much more serious than were the pre-1977 consequences. Cf Schneider, Die Zurikweisungverspt'teten Vorbringens, (1965] ZUuSTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 328,
331.
20 It has been argued that article 528 is still too permissive. See Wolff, Die Beriicksichtigung verspeiteten Vorbringens in der Berufungsinstanz, 94 ZErrscHntwr F R ZIvLPROZEss 310 (1981).
21 Cf zur Megede, Entlastungder Gerichte in Zivilsachen durch Rechtsanwilte?, FEsTSCHRiFrT FR RuDOLF WASSERMANN 765 (C. Broda ed. 1985).
22 W. PREIBISCH, AUSSERGERICHTLICHE VORVERFAHREN IN STRErrIGKErrEN DER ZVILGERICHTSBARKErr 278 (1982).
A request that the court order the taking of proof must rest on a tangible basis: the court will

not order the taking of a so-called Ausforschungsbeweis. BGH, Second Civil Senate, Decision of 14
Mar. 1968, 27 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1233. However, where the evidence in question is
within the control of the other party, the difficulties faced by the party requesting that the proof be
taken are considered in determining whether an adequate basis for the request has been made out.
See Gamp, Die Bedeutung des Ausforschungsbeweis im Zivilprozess, 60 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG 165
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Standesrechts) allow lawyers only to a limited extent to clarify the factual
situation themselves." ' 23 The 1977 reform has not produced changes in
article 6 of the canons which addresses
the role that lawyers are to play in
24
questioning witnesses prior to trial.
The current version of article 6 was promulgated by the Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer in 1973. It provides that "[ojut of court the lawyer
may interrogate persons, who come into question as witnesses, with respect to their knowledge when such is necessary for a dutiful (pflichtgemssen) clarification of the factual situation, advice, or representation." The
article concludes with the admonition that "[i]n every case, even the appearance of impermissible influence is to be avoided."
The position taken by the canons of ethics with respect to out-ofcourt contacts between lawyers and witnesses has changed somewhat
over the decades. In the 1957 canons, as previously, the problem was
addressed as part of the provisions dealing with criminal law. 25 Since
1963, the issue has been treated in general terms. The 1929 canons declared that "in itself, questioning of a witness by a lawyer was permissible." However, "especial care and foresight" were advised and
"scrupulously everything was to be avoided that could be interpreted as
an effort to influence" the witness. 2 6 The 1934 canons spoke of such
questioning as "riot permissible. ' 27 By 1957, the canons permitted questioning when necessary and justified by special circumstances. 28 In 1963,
and again in 1973, the canons took a somewhat more permissive position. Questioning is permissible when required for a dutiful clarification
29
of the factual situation.
It still remains true, however, that German judges are suspicious of
witnesses who have been examined by a lawyer prior to giving their testimony in court.3 0 Rather than urging a more active pre-trial role for lawyers, commentators rely on the preparatory proceedings directed by the
(1982). In practice, proof offers are rarely rejected as too speculative. See L. ROSENBERG & K.
ScHWA, ZMVnLPROZESSRECrT § 119
3 (13th ed. 1981).
It is also worth remarking that in certain situations the courts require one party to assist the
other in bringing out relevant facts. This is done either by shifting the burden of proof or by treating a party's failure to assist as an element in evaluating evidence under article 286 of the Code. See
Peters, Beweisvereitelung und Mitwirkungspflicht des Beweisgegners, 82 ZErrSCHRiFr FOR ZrLPROZESs 200
(1969); P. SCHAAFF, DIsCOVERY UND ANDERE MrrrEL DER SACHVERHALTSAUFKLARUNG IN ENGLISCHEN
PRE-TRIAL-VERFAHREN IM VERGLEICH ZUM DEUTSCHEN ZMLPROZESS 130-31 (1983). As a consequence of these developments, one can now speak, though not without reservations, of a "Kooperationsmaxime" in German civil procedure. See B. HAHN, KOOPERATIONSMAXIME IM ZIWLPROZESS? 299302 (1983).
23 W. PREIBISCH, supra note 22, at 278; see also Schwab, Beschleunigung des Verfahrens, Humane
Justiz 29, 33 (P. Gilles ed. 1977).
24 See J. LINGENBERG & F. HUMMEL, KOMMENTAR ZU DEN GRUNDSXAEN DES ANWALTLICHEN
STANDESRECHTS 67, § 6 comment 2 (1981).
25 Id.
26 I4
27 I-

28 Id
29

I&

30 See id at 66, § 6 comment 1; see also Kdtz, Civil Litigation and the Public Interest, 1 Crv. JusT. 0,
237, 241 (1982) ("German judges would take an extremely dim view of the reliability of witnesses
who previously had discussed the case with counsel"); zur Megede, supra note 21, at 786.
Another indication of the extent to which the system seeks to insulate witnesses from any possible party influence is the view that proof orders should, in principle, not indicate which party seeks
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court to give a party a reasonable opportunity to prepare his case before
the principal proceeding begins.3' The 1977 reform has, therefore, not
directly strengthened the pre-trial investigatory capacity of the party or
his lawyer.
The central issue that has emerged regarding the role of the courts
under the 1977 reform is how rigidly and rigorously the system of exclusion is to operate. At issue is the proper balance between expeditious
justice and substantive justice.3 2 Where the party's general article 282
obligation to facilitate proceedings is in question, the sanction of exclusion operates only where the delay in submission involved gross negligence.3 3 The sanction operates more harshly where a party fails to
respond in a timely fashion to preparatory measures ordered by the
court. In such cases, article 2961 provides that a late submission is to be
accepted only if the court is convinced either that the admission will not
delay the disposition of the controversy or the party can provide a satisfactory excuse for the delay.
The preparatory measures that fall within article 2961 are the following: orders, which can be handed down at any stage in the proceedings,
directing supplementation or explanation of a preparatory writing or requiring a party to present documents;3 4 and orders for written responses
to the complaint 3 5 or to the defendant's reply36 made to prepare a prior
first session.
In practice, the courts only rarely excuse delay in taking these preparatory steps.3 7 Accordingly, the crucial issue for the application of article 2961 is whether admitting late material delays the disposal of the
controversy within the meaning of article 296. To the extent that the
submission raises issues on which witnesses must be heard, a further session is required to hear them; accordingly, admission will clearly delay
the disposition of the controversy if the court would, but for the submission, have been in a position to render judgment at the session's close.
Therefore, controversy respecting the application of article 2961 primarily arises where the delayed submission is offered for a session that
would presumably not have disposed of the controversy even had the
submission been timely. In a decision by its Seventh Civil Senate, the
highest civil court, the Bundesgerichtshof,originally took the position that,
unless the first session was clearly intended as only an opportunity to
explore the controversy with the parties on a preliminary basis, untimely
submissions were to be rejected. 38 The test applied was whether the proto establish the points on which evidence is to be taken. See Teplitz, Der Beweisantragim Ziilprozess
und seine Behandlung durch die Gerichte, 8 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 71, 75-76 (1968).
31 See, e.g., Preibisch, supra note 22, at 278-80.
32 See Pieper, supra note 9. Pieper's essay discusses the various positions taken by the German
courts after 1977 in applying article 296 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
33 ZPO art. 29611.
34 ZPO art. 27311 no. 1.
35 Art. 2751, sent. 1; art. 2771-Ill.
36 Art. 275111; art. 2771V.
37 See Deubner, Zurfickweisung verspifteten Vorbringens als Rechtsmissbrauch, 40 NEUE JURISTXSCHE
WOCHENSCHRiFr 465 (1987).

38

BGH, Seventh Civil Senate, Decision of 2 Dec. 1982, 86 EBGH 31.
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ceedings would last longer if the late submission were admitted rather
than rejected; it was irrelevant that the effect on the duration of the proceedings, had the submission been made in a timely fashion, would have
been identical with that of admitting the untimely submission. 9 This exclusionary rule was to be relaxed only in cases where it was unmistakably
40
clear that the prior first session was not intended to reach the merits.
In 1986, the Sixth Civil Senate of the Bundesgerichtshoftook a significantly more permissive view. 4 ' The Seventh Civil Senate's position was
seen as resting on a purely formal ground. The Sixth Senate's test was
whether the court would have been in a position to dispose of the controversy without requiring a further session had the submission been timely.
If not, the Sixth Senate saw no difference in practical effect between
timely submission before the session and untimely submission at the session; consideration of the submission would require a further session regardless of its timeliness. The practical importance of this change of
position is suggested by the fact that, in 1986, three-quarters of the Bavarian Landgericht chambers used the prior first session at least one time
42
out of two for a quick review of the matter (a Durchlauftermin).
The directive or managerial functions that now rest on first instance
judges include, in addition to those already discussed, a duty to bring to
a party's attention gaps or ambiguities in the presentation of his case.
Under article 2731, no. 1, the court is to draw attention to deficiencies in
the preparatory writings and in other material presented to the court. A
general duty of clarification has long rested on judges under article 139;
the first paragraph of the article in its present version is to the effect that
The presiding judge must see to it that the parties explain their
positions fully as to all relevant facts and make the appropriate motions, in particular supplement inadequate statements of the facts relied upon and indicate the means of proof. For this purpose, the judge
must, insofar as is required, discuss the factual situation and the issues
with the parties from both the factual and legal points of view and put
questions [to them]..
These duties of clarification assume greater significance as the trial
becomes more concentrated. In particular, they now serve as
counterweights to the strict exclusionary rules introduced in 1977 with a
view to rendering the trial less episodic. 43 Where the court has not discharged its duty of clarification, it may well share responsibility with the
parties for a submission's untimeliness. In such cases, article 296 does
39 Ik-at 34.

40 Id.at 39 (where the session was unmistakably a "Durchlauftermin," one for a quick review of the
matter with the parties in preparation for a principal session, untimely submissions were admissible).
41 Decision of 21 Oct. 1986, 98 EBGH 368.
42 Greger, supra note 9, at 379-80. It seems that in Bavaria relatively little use is currently being
made of article 296. For the period from late October 1986 until December 1986, some ninety
percent of the judges reported that in a prior first session they never, or only very rarely, excluded
submissions on the ground of untimeliness. I& at 380. In ninety percent of the Bavarian courts,
exclusion in the principal session occurred in fewer than ten percent of the cases. Id at 382. It was
agreed, however, that the existence of article 296 has had a beneficial effect. Id See also id at 384.
43 "The new clarification duties, especially ZPO §§ 278111 and 27711, were introduced into the
Code of Civil Procedure in order to make the harsh time and exclusion rules bearable." Constitutional Court, First Senate, Decision of 30 Jan. 1985, 69 EBVG 126, 133.
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not apply because a party is not to be prejudiced by the court's failure to
observe a procedural requirement. 4 4 On occasion, however, the lower
courts either do not realize that they have committed a procedural error
or fail to draw the conclusion
that, in consequence, exclusion under arti45
cle 296 is improper.
The argument that the 1977 reform violates the constitutional principle of equality before the law-article 3(1) of the Basic Law-and the
constitutional right to a proper court hearing (rechtliches Geh&)-article
103(l)-has been rejected by the Constitutional Court. 4 6 Even article
528111, under which means of attack and defense, properly excluded in
first instance on grounds of untimeliness, are likewise excluded in the
47
first level of appellate proceedings, is constitutional in principle
although the provision undermines in significant measure the cherished
principle of continental civil procedure that the parties have two full opportunities-one in first instance, the other in second instance-to present the case in both its factual and legal aspects to the adjudicator.
However, various applications of the 1977 reform have, in view of the
48
particular circumstances of the case, been held unconstitutional.
Judging by the number of decisions that have considered whether
the courts have used too vigorously the sanctions provided by the 1977
reforms, the judges are acting energetically. Unfortunately, the available
material sheds little light on the extent to which the limitations that exist
in German practices on the lawyer's pretrial preparation, especially
where relevant material is controlled by the other side, are producing
harsh results because, although a side is surprised at the trial stage, a
remedial submission is excluded under article 296 as untimely.
44 Constitutional Court, First Senate, Decision of 14 Apr. 1987, 40 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2003 (1987); see also Deubner, supra note 37, at 1586.
45 See Deubner, supra note 37, at 1585-86. However, many decisions use the clarification duty to
mitigate article 296's rigor. See Leipold, Auf der Suche nach dem richfigen Mass bei der Zurdicweisung
versp'teten Vorbringens, 97 ZErrsCHRIFT FOR ZIVILPROZEss 395, 407-08 (1984).
Commentators disagree as to interaction between articles 139 and 296. Some take the position
that only the impartiality principle, Unparteilichkeit, sets a limit to the judicial initiative under article
139. E.g., H. THOMAS & H. PuTzo, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 139 comment 1 (14th ed. 1986). Others
advance the position that rules respecting the inadmissibility of untimely matter should operate to
restrict use of the court's article 139 powers. A. BAUMBACH & P. HARTMANN, ZMWLPROZESSORDRUNG

§ 139 comment 1 (43d ed. 1985).
46 The Second Senate of the Constitutional Court wrote in 1981: "[t]hat the legislator in civil
procedure has, as a procedural matter, created the possibility to reject late submissions of a party in
the interest of tightening up, Straffung, and expediting litigation does not, to be sure, encounter
constitutional objections. Even the fundamental principle of the right to a proper hearing, rechtlichen
Gehis, does not stand in the way of such a rule." Decision of 29 Apr. 1980, 54 EBVG 117, 123. The
Senate went on, however, to hold application of ZPO art. 296 unconstitutional in the circumstance of
the case.
For a general discussion of the control that the Constitutional Court has exercised under the
Basic Law over procedural questions, see E. SCHUMANN, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, GRUNDGESETZ
UND ZIVILPROZESS (1983).

47 Constitutional Court, First Senate, Decision of 7 Oct. 1980, 55 EBVG 72.
48 E.g., Constitutional Court, Second Senate, Decision of 29 Apr. 1980, supra note 46; see also
Constitutional Court, First Senate, Decision of 7 Oct. 1980, supra note 47, at 396-401.
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Some Comparative Reflections

In recent decades discontent with first instance procedure has been
frequently voiced in both the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany. Delay has been the principal sore point for both systems. As
already shown, 4 9 the problem was central to recent German procedural
reforms. At least since the 1960's delay and the related issue of expense
have been at the heart of Federal Rules reform. The 1983 amendments
of Rule 16 Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management and Rule 26
General Provisions Governing Discovery address the delay and cost
problems that have developed in the pretrial phase of American first instance proceedings.
The efforts of these two systems to deal with delay and related
problems are causing them to converge in a curious and interesting fashion. In the first place, for both systems the distinction between trial and
pretrial phases is becoming less important; secondly, judges are more
and more being called upon to play directive and managerial roles; lastly,
these developments raise for each system somewhat comparable questions respecting the proper balance between efficiency and justice.
Delay problems are caused both by a system's insufficient capacity
and by party abuse of the system. The capacity of a given system can be
increased in many ways. Adding personnel is perhaps the most obvious.
Development of substantive-law rules that are more, clear-cut and dispositive than those they replace should reduce the range of potentially relevant evidence and make it possible in many cases for the adjudicator to
decide with less reflection.
A system's capacity can also be increased by changing particular institutional arrangements. For example, if collegial courts are used in first
instance, personnel can be employed more efficiently by relying to a
greater extent on single-judge courts. The Germans took this step in
1924 by introducing a single-judge proceeding into the collegial Landgerichte. In 1974, amendments to articles 348-50 of the Code of Civil Procedure sought to increase significantly the reliance on, and the
effectiveness of, single judges in handling first instance proceedings. 5 0
The capacity of a procedural system can also be enlarged by taking
steps to reduce the delay that occurs because one or both parties are
dilatory. A reduction in delay for which a party is basically responsible
serves not only the other party's claim to receive reasonably prompt justice but also increases the system's capacity and makes litigation generally more expeditious.
In spite of their quite different .procedural structures, in recent decades the quest for prompter justice has led German and American reformers to adopt solutions that exhibit interesting similarities.
Increasingly, both German and American judges have become litigation
directors-managers. The additional directing responsibility that the
49 See pp. 614-15 supra.
50 This reform may not have achieved what was hoped. See Mkrz, Das Landgericht in Zivilsachenein anachronistischerJanuskopf?,FESTSCHRIFr FUR RUDOLF WASSERMANN 735, 759-64 (ed. C. Broda

1985).
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1977 amendments to the German Code of Civil Procedure placed on
judges, and the tools they were given to carry out this responsibility, have
already been discussed. Today German judges carry, and are equipped
to discharge, much larger managerial responsibilities than in the past.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1983, go significantly further than the German Code in placing directing and managerial responsibility on first instance judges.5 1 Rule 16(a) permits the
court "in its discretion, [to] direct the attorneys for the parties and any
unrepresented party to appear before it for a conference or conferences
before trial .... " Among the purposes of such conferences are "expediting the disposition of the action" and "establishing early and continuing
control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of
management."
Rule 16(b) requires that, "[e]xcept in categories of actions exempted
by district court rule as inappropriate," the court shall after appropriate
consultation
enter a scheduling order that limits the time
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;
(2) to file and hear motions; and
(3) to complete discovery.
The scheduling order also may include
(4) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial
conference, and trial; and
(5) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the
case.
The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more than
120 days after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall not be modified except by leave of the judge or a magistrate when authorized by
district court rule upon a showing of good cause.
The system of pretrial procedures and scheduling orders now provided by Rule 16 is a natural, though not an inevitable, development for
a procedural system that combines an abbreviated pleading process and
a concentrated trial with arrangements designed to permit each party to
familiarize himself with the details of the position and the evidence that
the other party may ultimately present at the trial. In particular, large
reliance on pretrial discovery inevitably involves the judge deeply in the
process of gathering cause materials. Pretrial discovery can lead to long
delay and great expense; the more inclusive the potential scope of discovery, the greater the need to monitor the process. In the nature of the
problem, control cannot be mechanical or automatic; an exercise ofjudicial authority and discretion is required.
51 This is especially true for so-called complex litigation, now the subject of a separate litigation
manual. For a variety of reasons, including different approaches to the class action problem, American complex litigation has no true German counterpart. Moreover, the American courts are experimenting in a way which would not be found in Germany by integrating various alternative dispute
resolution processes into the trial process, e.g., arbitration, mini-trials, so-called summary jury trials
and mediation. See Peckham, A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage
Discovery Planningand Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 253, 267-77 (1985).
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The scope of thejudidal control over the pretrial phase engendered
by the discovery process is seen in Rule 26(b)(1). It is there provided
that:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth
in subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i)
the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
The Federal Rules have thus called the "managerial judge"5 2 into
being. "These new judicial functions have radically transformed the federaljudge from a passive umpire to a managerial activist."5 3s As a part of
the same development, the traditional line in American procedure between the pretrial phase-necessarily discontinuous-and the concentrated trial phase has been blurred. Today the federal judge assumes
control over the pretrial phase of proceedings with the consequence,
among others, that contemporary judges, unlike their traditional counterparts, know a great deal about the case before it comes to trial when
the same judge handles the pretrial and trial stages as seems to be the
current federal practice.5 Seen in their totality, federal proceedings
have for the judge, though not for the jury, become discontinuous; just
as the German principal session, the federal concentrated trial is now for
the judge the final event in an episodic process.
These changes may, over time, cause the federal judge's role at the
trial stage to move closer to that of the German judge. Where the lawyers are active at the pretrial stage and the judge is not, the traditional
American practice of the lawyers questioning witnesses and presenting
the matter at the trial stage is natural and probably inevitable. However,
where the judge and lawyers are both thoroughly familiar with the case
when the trial phase begins, the judge is in a position to play a much
larger role than in the past in the examination of witnesses and in other
aspects of the factual development of the case. At least for nonjury trials,
forces are thus at work that may cause federal judges to exercise a
stronger control at the trial stage over such matters as the examination of
witnesses. Of course, a difference of importance remains in the positions
of German and federal judges. Neither the German judge nor the German lawyer is in a position to explore thoroughly the factual side of the
52 Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HnAv. L. REv. 376 (1982). The article is an instructive and
stimulating discussion both of how-and why-the role of federal judges has changed in recent decades and of the costs that the changes may entail. For a thoughtful rejoinder, see Peckham, supra
note 51, at 260-67.
53 Peckham, supra note 51, at 254.
54 In 1969, "most metropolitan federal district courts transferred from a master calendar system
to an individual assignment system.... In an individual assignment system, each case is assigned to
one judge, who follows the case from filing until termination." 1d at 257.
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case before the discontinuous trial begins; under the Federal Rules, not
only the lawyers, but now the judge as well, know a great deal about the
facts. American lawyers, with a full grasp of the facts, are both psychologically and technically in a much better position than their German colleagues to resist judicial management of such aspects of the case's
presentation as the examination of witnesses.
The convergence between the German discontinuous trial and the
American concentrated trial does not affect one advantage enjoyed by
the former system, the absence of pretrial contact between lawyer and
witness. A concentrated trial system could avoid such pretrial contact
only by turning from adversarial to inquisitorial methods for developing
the case materials. Accordingly, federal procedure must accept the disadvantage that the witness's story at trial may well be affected by pretrial
contact with the perspective brought to the case by the lawyer who interviews and questions him even where the lawyer observes every propriety.5 5 Perhaps this consideration explains why the German reformers, in
their effort to achieve prompt justice by concentrating the trial stage, did
not remove the constraints that the German system has traditionally imposed upon lawyers interviewing witnesses prior to their appearance in
court.
The German and the federal procedural systems have thus converged in several significant respects. 5 6 In both, judges are increasingly
managerial. Moreover, the German trial phase is less discontinuous than
in the past and the judge is more involved than formerly in the pretrial
phase; for its part, federal procedure has taken giant strides in the direction of integrating an episodic pretrial phase with a concentrated trial.
The two systems may also be converging at a deeper and more subtle
level, that of values. It appears that both are giving increased emphasis
to efficiency and less emphasis to other justice values.
The pursuit of one value is often at the cost of another value.
Clearly, interaction is not necessarily harmonious or supportive between
efficiency, on the one hand, and objectivity or the reasonably full opportunity to present one's case, on the other. At least until 1986, the efficiency value served by the 1977 German reforms was probably pursued
at too great a cost to the opportunity to present one's case. 5 7 In this
period, a great many courts of first instance took the position that a submission made beyond the time period fixed by the court should be refused even though late admission would not prolong the proceedings
any more than timely submission would have.
The refusal to admit the untimely submission served, of course, the
cause of efficiency; the court had less to do to dispose of the matter. But,
See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 86 (1949).
56 One significant aspect in which there is little or no convergence is that the American system,
as a matter of principle, makes it possible for each side to obtain relevant information in the other
party's control even though the latter did not intend to use the material at trial so that the surprise
problem is not implicated. The German system is presumably philosophically opposed to such
55

sweeping investigation; in all events, it has never contemplated providing machinery by which such
information could be obtained in civil litigation.
57 See pp. 620-21 supra; cf. Pieper, supra note 9.
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is it just to impose the drastic sanction of exclusion where the delay that
results from admitting the untimely submission would have resulted as
well from the admission of the submission had it been timely? In the
circumstances, untimeliness does not harm the administration ofjustice.
Of course, on occasion one is punished for conduct that is objectively
wrongful even though no harm has been done. A driver who exceeds the
speed limit is fined on the theory that conduct dangerous to society will
thereby be deterred. But is the deterrent effect that may flow from the
exclusion in principle of untimely submissions such a significant contribution to the cause of efficiency as to overcome the policy favoring the
just resolution of the parties' dispute? Further, is it appropriate for a
legal system to seek relief from overburdened dockets by applying an
exclusionary rule where the conduct on which the exclusion rests does
not in any way add to the court's burden?
In 1986, as we have seen, 58 the highest German court for civil matters concluded that the exclusion in principle of untimely submissions
was improper. In reaching this result the Bundesgerichtshof answered in
the negative the two questions just put. The proper balance between
efficiency and other values must now be struck in more particularized
contexts. The concern remains that the overall administration of the
1977 reforms may give too much weight to efficiency. 59 Indeed, the
mechanisms adopted to deal with the delay problem pose a temptation
for overworked judges: exclusion makes it unnecessary for the courts to
go to the effort involved in clarifying the factual and legal issues raised by
60
the rejected submissions.
The clash between efficiency and other values in the newly revised
Federal Rules occurs in a context very different from the German system.
Likewise, the forms that the clash take are more varied and complex than
those encountered in German procedure. Butthe fear is not without basis that the efficiency value that inheres in the very concept of the managerial judge may result in the federal courts giving less weight than is
desirable to other justice values in their handling of cases. 6 ' We do well
to bear in mind always that the measure ofjustice cannot be speed alone.

58 See p. 621 supra.
59 The 1977 reforms have produced a degree of inefficiency in their own way. For example,
exclusionary rules have provoked litigation which seeks to overturn exclusionary rulings. To avoid
exclusion, recourse is had to various evasive tactics that are procedurally inefficient, e.g., accepting a
default judgment, Versiumnisurtel, so that the proceeding can be fully reopened, or entirely suppressing the matter in first instance so that it can be brought forward on.appeal, Bendfung, without
running the risk of article 528 exclusion. See Lindemann, Hausgemachte Uberlastungder Zivilgerichte?,
33 Anwaltsblatt 389 (1983).
60 See Bundesgerichtshof, Sixth Civil Senate, Decision of 21 Oct. 1986, 98 EBGH 368, 374. Cf
Deubner, supra note 37, at 468; Deubner, Das unbewdi Itigte Gesetz-Neue Entscheidungen zur
Ztfrckweisung verspif teten Vorbringens, 40 NEUE JURISTISCHE WocHENscHRiFF 1583, 1584 (1987).
61 See Resnick, supra note 52.

